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Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals 1, Gleave moves this Court to suspend Rule 35(d) 
for the purpose of reconsidering its Order of February 22, 
1988.2 The grounds for this motion are as follows: 
1. At trial, Gleave offered evidence of "near 
misses" as well as two prior accidents. The evidence was 
refused by the Court. However, Gleave preserved an offer of 
proof. The evidence clearly should have been received. 
Robinson v. Seaboard R.R., Inc., 361 S.E. 2d 909 (N.C. App. 
1987). 
2. During the briefing of the case, neither 
party referred to the proffered evidence of "near misses." 
Rather, both parties relied upon other evidence in the 
record. 
l"In the interest of expediting a decision, the Court 
of Appeals . . . may . . . suspend the requirements or 
provisions of any of these rules. . ." 
2Rule 35(d) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
states, ". . . consecutive petitions for rehearing will not 
be received by the clerk." Technically, this is an initial 
motion to reconsider the Order of February 22, 1988. 
However, the Court might construe this to be a "consecutive 
petition" or second petition to reconsider the opinion of 
January 28, 1988. The Court would be required to act under 
Rule 2 (to suspend Rule 35(d)) in order to consider this 
petition. 
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3. The Court's analysis of this case went beyond 
the issues raised in the briefs. Thus, this Court sua 
sponte searched the record with respect to "near misses." 
The opinion of this Court states: 
Gleave's attorney claimed he would offer 
evidence at trial of "near misses" at 
the crossing, but none was produced. 
(Slip Opinion at p. 19.) 
4. Gleave filed a Petition for Reconsideration. 
Gleave argued, inter alia, that the Court had overlooked 
plaintiff's offer of proof regarding "near misses" and prior 
accidents. 
5. This Court entered an Order (February 22, 
1988) denying the Petition for Reconsideration. With 
respect to the "near misses," this Court stated: 
Because Gleave did not raise in his 
cross-appeal the issue of whether the 
Court erroneously excluded his proffered 
near-miss and prior accident evidence, 
we have not and will not address the 
issue. 
Reviewing the correctness of the direc-
ted verdict in light of the evidence 
actually presented^ and admitted at 
.... trial, we adhere to the conclusion in 
our January 28, 1988, opinion. . . 
^This Court erroneously believed that this evidence was 
excluded in a pre-trial ruling. (See Order February 22, 
1988.) In fact, plaintiff's offer of proof and the Court's 
ruling came during the trial. R. 1683-1686.) 
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6. It is respectfully submitted that this Court's 
Order of February 22, 1988, erred as a matter of law. The 
correct law is as follows: 
We hold the trial court erred in 
dismissing plaintiff's action . • • In 
passing on this assignment of error, 
evidence erroneously excluded is to be 
considered with other evidence offered 
by plaintiffs. Woodward v. Pressley, 
249 S.E. 2d 471 (N.C. App. 1978.) 
• • * 
In considering whether the trial court 
should have sustained defendant's 
motions for directed verdicts, this 
court will look to all the competent 
evidence, including facts which were 
shown by proof but which were withdrawn 
from the jury by the trial judge, 
especially where such evidence was 
improperly withdrawn, as we think was 
true in this case. Beene v. Cook, 311 
S.W. 2d 596, 602 (Tenn. 1957). 
* * * 
In passing on the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we have considered that 
offered by plaintiff and improperly 
excluded by the court. Smith v. J.C. 
Penny Co., 149 N.W. 2d 794 (Iowa 1967). 
7. This Court's Order of February 22, 1988, 
chides plaintiff for not raising the issue of "near misses" 
until the Petition for Reconsideration. It was certainly 
Gleave's right — and Gleave's risk — to rely on other 
evidence, and to ignore the "near misses" evidence. This 
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court, likewise, had every right to ignore the "near miss" 
evidence, since it was not raised in the briefs. 
However, this Court chose to search the record and 
to raise the issue of "near misses" sua sponte. Gleave 
concedes that the Court has power to search the record and 
raise issues sua sponte. (See e.g. Swenson v. Thibaut, 250 
SoE. 2d 279, 293 (N.C* 1978). However, having raised the 
issuer the Court must: resolve it! Here the Court raised an 
issue sua sponte, but the Court did not resolve it. Rather, 
after raising the issue, the Court relied on a clearly 
erroneous ruling of the trial court. That was an error of 
law and an abdication of appellate jurisdiction. 
8. In summary, this Court should withdraw its 
Order of February 22, 1988, and thereby proceed to 
reconsider the opinion of January 28, 1983. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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